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Abstract 
The Basel III Accord was the centerpiece of the international regulatory response to the global 
financial crisis, setting new capital requirements for internationally active banks. This paper 
explains the divergent preferences on Basel III of national regulators in three countries that 
approximate what are frequently presented as distinct varieties of capitalism in Europe – 
Germany, the United Kingdom and France. It is argued that national regulators faced a 
‘trilemma’ in setting capital requirements, having to prioritize among banking sector stability, 
the competitiveness of national banks and short to medium term economic growth. Different 
varieties of national financial system – specifically, banking system and different kinds of 
‘banking champions’ – explain the different prioritization of objectives in the ‘trilemma’ and 
hence for the divergent preferences of national regulators on Basel III capital requirements.  
 
Keywords: Capitalism, varieties of, finance, regulation  
JEL classification: G21 Banks, G28 Government policy and regulation, P16 Political 
Economy 
 
1. Introduction 
The Basel III Accord on a ‘Global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking 
systems’ issued in late 2010 was the cornerstone of the international regulatory response to 
the global financial crisis. The accord was designed to set capital requirements for banks 
worldwide. Capital requirements have traditionally been regarded as the main instruments to 
ensure the stability of the banking sector. In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) issued the Basel I Accord on ‘International convergence of capital 
measurement and capital standards’ (Kapstein, 1989, 1992; Simmons, 2001), which was 
updated by the Basel II Accord in 2004 (Tsingou, 2008; Underhill and Zhang, 2008; Wood, 
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2005). Over time, these ‘soft’ international rules have been incorporated into (legally binding) 
national legislation in more than 100 countries. In the European Union (EU) this has been 
done through the capital requirements directives (Underhill, 1998; Howarth and Quaglia, 
2013).1  
 
This paper explains the divergent preferences of the national regulators of three main 
European countries – Germany, the United Kingdom and France – on Basel III. These 
countries are selected principally because they are the largest financial, and specifically 
banking, systems in Europe and, with the United States, China and Japan, they are among the 
six largest in the world. They are also selected because, in the Varieties of Capitalism 
literature, Germany and the UK are frequently presented as the closest European 
approximations of distinct varieties – Germany, the Coordinated Market Economy; the UK, 
the Liberal Market Economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001); while France – a unique hybrid – is 
presented as a post-State-led, ‘Mixed Market’ or even State-enhanced economy (Schmidt, 
2003). The US is not included in this analysis because the main purpose of the paper is not to 
explain the outcome of Basel III negotiations, but rather to map the configuration of the three 
largest national financial systems in Europe and explain how this configuration influenced the 
preferences of national regulators on the capital requirements they agreed at the international 
level. 
 
This paper first argues that national financial regulators face a ‘trilemma’ as they seek to 
achieve and prioritize three different objectives: financial stability, bank competitiveness and 
economic growth. Existing political economy scholarship on international financial 
cooperation has mainly focused on the ‘dilemma’ between financial stability and 
competitiveness of the national financial industry. Rather surprisingly, it has missed an 
important element of consideration: the link between financial regulation (here capital 
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requirements), the flow of credit to the real economy and ultimately economic growth. By 
explaining the trilemma, this research brings insights from Comparative Political Economy 
into a topic of research – banking prudential regulation – traditionally dominated by 
International Political Economy. 
 
Second, this paper shows how the preferences of European national regulators on Basel III are 
the result of the domestic political economy (for a similar argument that focuses more broadly 
on national political economies see Fioretos, 2010). However, one needs to look at domestic 
institutional factors that are often overlooked (or not investigated) by the literature on 
Varieties of Capitalism, namely the configuration of the national financial system and, more 
specifically, the national banking system. By carrying out a comprehensive analysis of 
national banking systems in the UK, France and Germany and outlining their main relevant 
features, this paper fills a gap in the literature on Varieties of Capitalism. It also explains how 
different national banking / financial systems result in different priorities assigned by national 
regulators to the three objectives of the ‘trilemma’ on banking regulation and capital 
requirements more specifically. This paper thus develops a predictive framework that can be 
applied to explain other national positions on international capital standards and, potentially, 
other areas of banking regulation. 
   
2. State of the art and theoretical framework 
In much of the literature, the assumption is that international regulatory cooperation benefits 
some countries more than others, affecting the competitiveness of national firms – it has 
therefore redistributive implications (Oatley and Nabors, 1998). Consequently, international 
regulatory cooperation and harmonization will take place only when they are in line with the 
preferences of the main jurisdiction, which in the past was the US because of the size of its 
domestic market (Simmons, 2001). Recently, International Political Economy scholars have 
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considered the preferences and power of other jurisdictions with large domestic markets 
(Drezner, 2007). In this literature, policy makers’ preferences are shaped by concerns for the 
competitiveness of national banks in international markets, and by the need to ensure financial 
stability domestically (Singer, 2004, 2007). This is the ‘dilemma’ of financial regulators 
(Kapstein, 1989).  
 
This paper argues that, rather than a ‘dilemma’, regulators face a ‘trilemma’ in their policy 
making on financial regulation: financial stability, competiveness of financial industry and 
economic growth, because banks and banking rules have implications for credit to the real 
economy. Policy makers have to prioritize among these three objectives and their ranking of 
objectives largely depends on the national variety of financial capitalism. Hence, our use of 
the term ‘trilemma’ differs from the financial trilemma of Dirk Schoenmaker (2013), which 
examines the interplay of financial stability, international financial integration (notably, cross-
border banking) and national financial policies. He argues that any two of the three objectives 
can be combined but not all three: one has to give. Our trilemma is not conceived in such 
exclusionary terms: no objective is entirely discarded to achieve the others. Rather, the 
compatibility of the three objectives of our trilemma can be difficult, optimizing all three 
objectives at the same time impossible and an order of priority must be set.	  
 
A second stream of literature focuses on the pervasive power of big transnational banks, 
which are influential lobbyists with plenty of financial, human and technical resources at their 
disposal (Baker, 2010; King and Sinclair, 2003; Tsingou, 2008; Underhill and Zhang, 2008; 
Underhill et al., 2010). Building on these insights, Lall (2012, p. 7) argues that Basel II and 
Basel III were ‘the product of regulatory capture by large international banks in G-10 
countries’. By contrast, Young (2012, p. 663) qualifies the extent of ‘regulatory capture’ in 
Basel II, arguing that while private sector lobbyists had easy access to the regulatory process, 
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this ‘access’ did not always mean ‘influence’ over the outcome.  Yet, this literature often does 
not explore the underlying foundations of financial industry preferences, as our paper sets out 
to do.  
 
Third, social constructivist works on the institutional features and working dynamics of a 
number of international financial regulatory bodies argue that financial governance 
arrangements no longer belong to the realm of intergovernmental negotiations but fall within 
the responsibility of a ‘transnational policy community of experts actors’ (Tsingou, 2010, p. 
21). These actors have common professional and educational backgrounds (Chiewroth, 2007) 
and share similar epistemological views (for example, Kapstein, 1992 defined the BCBS as an 
embryonic ‘epistemic community’).  
 
Yet, financial regulation is a technical matter that has significant and different economic and 
political effects across national banking sectors. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, 
financial regulation has become less insulated than in the past from politics and politicians 
(Helleiner and Pagliari, 2011) – it is no longer ‘quiet politics’ (Culpepper, 2011). Moreover, 
the few works that examine the BCBS (e.g., Kapstein, 1989; Simmons, 2001; Wood, 2005) 
rarely consider its actorness, but rather examine it as an international forum of national 
regulators, who act in the Committee as ‘reluctant diplomats’ (Slaughter, 2004). This is 
because, unlike for example the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank 
(Chiewroth, 2007; Moschella, 2012), the BCBS has a skeletal structure of officials often 
seconded to Basel by national regulators and has a limited budget. Its working groups are 
composed of and chaired by national regulators. It works by consensus and issues soft law or 
gentlemen’s agreements.   
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Feeding into the literature on economic constructivism, some authors have pointed out the 
rise, prior to the international financial crisis, of the ‘neoliberal’ paradigm (Best, 2003; 
Gamble, 2009), that is a ‘governance light’ approach, which favoured ‘market-based 
governance’, based on a benign view of financial markets and grounded in efficient market 
theories (Mügge, 2011; Underhill et al., 2010, p. 10). In Europe, the UK was the main 
promoter of ‘light touch’ regulation (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009; Macartney, 2010), which 
was discredited by the financial crisis. By contrast, France, Germany and Italy had a ‘market-
shaping’ approach to financial regulation, which was in good currency in the aftermath of the 
crisis (Fioretos, 2010; Quaglia, 2010a, b; Zimmerman, 2010), especially in government 
discourse (Buckley and Howarth, 2010). However, the empirical analysis of the preferences 
of national regulators on key features of Basel III contradicts this explanation, because the 
British and US policy makers called for stricter rules on capital, whereas continental 
Europeans did not support them. Ideas – here set by regulatory paradigms – provide little 
guidance on national preference formation on Basel III.  
 
There is a literature exploring how domestic policy making / institutional frameworks shape 
financial regulatory choices, either through embedded legal frameworks that limit regulatory 
options (Howarth 2013) or through institutional frameworks that work to reinforce or 
diminish the influence of specific financial lobbies. In Germany, the federal structure of 
government and the central role of the Bundesrat (upper house) in law making help to explain 
the influence of the local savings banks and regional banks (Busch 2004; Deeg 1999). In 
France, some works highlight the close relationship between administrative elites staffing 
high-level positions in formerly state-owned banks (Schmidt 1996, Rouban 2010). In the UK, 
the pervasive influence of the City through specific institutional channels has also been 
critically examined (James 2014). In a comparative analysis (including France, the UK and 
Germany), Woll (2014) argues that different types of business–government relations 
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contribute to explaining the way in which the bank bailout packages were devised and 
implemented across countries (see also Grossman and Woll 2013). These accounts are useful 
in order to explain how banks influence public policy (or not) – government-bank interactions 
– but they are less insightful in explaining what either banks or governments want with 
reference to banking regulation,2 that is the sources and the content of their regulatory 
preferences, which we argue here mostly depends on the distinctive features of the national 
banking system in which they are embedded and bank business models. 
 
Other authors (for example, Pagliari 2013) have pointed to the role of public opinion and the 
political salience of financial regulation in order to explain the regulatory reforms undertaken 
since 2008. This explanation, based on the politicization of banking, points out the public 
antagonism to bankers and banks generated by the crisis, as expressed in opinion polls and the 
mobilization of groups to counter the influence of banks. Hence, the British government 
support for higher capital requirements could be explained by greater public outrage at bail-
outs (which resulted in part from the size of the bail-out) for ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks. In France 
and Germany, the (real and perceived) impact of the crisis was smaller than in the UK (Hardie 
and Howarth 2013), as was the public backlash against banks. This explanation focused on 
the domestic politics of financial regulation chimes well with the one developed in this article: 
the way in which the crisis played out in different countries is partly explained by the 
distinctive features of the national banking systems (Hardie and Howarth 2013), even though 
the public authorities’ reaction to the crisis was shaped by domestic political dynamics (Woll 
2014; Grossman and Woll 2013).  
 
A relatively recent body of work brings insight from Comparative Political Economy and 
historical institutionalism into International Political Economy (Bach and Newman, 2007, 
2010; Büthe and Mattli, 2011; Fioretos, 2001, 2010; Kalinowski, 2013; Posner, 2009, 2010; 
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Moschella and Tsingou, 2013). The basic argument is that ‘domestic regulatory institutions 
are the sources of both power and preferences on the global stage’ (Drezner, 2010, p. 794). 
The Comparative Political Economy approach adopted in this paper is inspired by historical 
institutionalism: it considers banking and more generally financial systems as institutions that 
shape domestic preferences on international agreements.  In so doing, the analysis developed 
in this paper adds to the Varieties of Capitalism literature, examining the financial 
underpinning of the national variety of capitalism, that is assumed and rarely explored in the 
literature (for two partial exceptions, see Busch, 2004; Zimmerman, 2010). Our analysis 
teases out three main features of national financial systems that affect the preferences of 
policy makers on financial regulation (here capital requirements) and specifically the 
‘trilemma’ they face in deciding whether to prioritize financial stability, bank competitiveness 
or economic growth.  
 
2.1 Research design 
This paper sets out to explain the prioritization of national regulators on the ‘trilemma’ 
objectives and their specific preferences on Basel III, which together form a two-stage 
dependent variable summarized in Table 3. The elements of the trilemma, namely stability, 
competitiveness and the real economy co-exist but they are not interdependent in and of 
themselves but rather in terms of the impact of selecting one upon the others. For example, if 
regulators prioritize stability this may have an impact upon the competitiveness of the 
banking sector (in relation to foreign banks) and upon the real economy (because, ceteris 
paribus, banks need to deleverage to improve their capital position). However, the 
prioritization of stability does not suggest a lack of concern for competitiveness and the real 
economy as objectives. Rather, the argument of this paper is that prioritization is driven by 
specific features of national banking systems as opposed to the rational interests of regulators. 
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We focus on national regulators because countries are represented in the BCBS by authorities 
from central banks or other supervisory bodies. Most of these officials have limited or no 
power to adopt regulation at the national level but they will always be involved in the drafting 
of national legislation – and in the political economy literature they are generally referred to 
as ‘regulators’.3 National politicians were one step removed from the Basel negotiations. We 
assume that national regulators were aware that the agreement reached in Basel had to be 
acceptable to their respective political authorities – notably ministers of finance – back home, 
but this is not to say that the preferences of national regulators in the BCBS were the same as 
government leaders. We do not investigate the domestic implementation of Basel III which 
would involve an analysis of the interaction between regulators and governments / 
legislatures. We are also aware that treating the preferences of national regulators as 
monolithic is an oversimplification, especially in the UK, where there was a plurality of actors 
shaping banking regulation, as noted in Section 3.  
 
Section 3 outlines the content of Basel III and teases out the preferences of regulators, the 
second part of our dependent variable, during the negotiations on the main issues at stake. The 
preferences of regulators are understood and analysed through: i) semi structured interviews 
with members of the BCBS and financial industry officials and representatives in the three 
countries, at the EU level and in other countries; ii) over a hundred position papers and 
official public responses to consultations by banking and other associations and individual 
banks posted on the BCBS website; and iii) a systematic survey of financial press coverage. 
The debate on the incorporation of Basel III into EU legislation and the legislative outcome 
are also examined because, on some of the core elements of the Basel III agreement, issues 
papered over and compromises reached behind the close doors of the BCBS meetings, 
unravelled during EU negotiations – hence, preferences on specific issues came openly to the 
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fore in the EU debate (IMF, 2011a). The positions of stakeholders (banks) are also considered 
in this section.4 
 
The independent variable is the configuration of the national banking / financial system. 
Specifically, three core features of national banking / financial systems that relate to the 
national variety of capitalism are examined, namely: internationalization and capital levels of 
national banking systems, and the relative importance of bank credit to national financial 
systems. Section 4 examines the configuration of national banking (and financial) systems, 
explaining how the three core features of national banking systems relate to the trilemma and 
to regulatory preferences on Basel III.5 This Comparative Political Economy analysis of the 
balance sheets of banks in the three countries is enriched by semi-structured elite interviews 
in order to corroborate some the financial data gathered and better understand the position of 
banks and regulators. The conclusion discusses the explanatory power of the framework 
developed here in order to understand the preferences of other national regulators given 
distinctive banking systems. 
 
3. The Basel III accord and national policy makers’ preferences 
The BCBS put forward concrete proposals on Basel III in December 2009 (BCBS, 2009a, b), 
which were then subject to public consultation. Other documents (for example on the 
countercyclical capital buffer, BCBS, 2010a) were issued for consultation throughout 2010. A 
general agreement was reached in July 2010 (BCBS, 2010b) and a final agreement was 
eventually signed in December (BCBS, 2010 e,f). Compared to the Basel II accord, Basel III 
was negotiated in record time – less than two years – due to the political salience imparted to 
it by the recent international financial crisis. The Basel III rules are to be phased in gradually 
from January 2013 until 2019. The accord has to be transposed into national (and / or EU) law 
in order to become legally binding.  
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Table 1 summarizes the preferences of British (and by way of comparison American), 
German and French policy makers on the main elements of Basel III.6 In a nutshell, UK and 
US regulators wanted a restrictive definition of capital and higher levels of capital, whereas 
French and German regulators were keen to have a broader definition of capital and lower 
capital requirements. UK and US regulators supported a leverage ratio, French and German 
regulators opposed it and asked for longer transition periods to implement the accord. Let us 
examine these elements in more detail. 
 
The accord provides for the first time a common definition of capital, on which there had 
been no agreement in the past. The main form of ‘Tier 1 capital’ must be common shares and 
retained earnings. The remainder of Tier 1 capital can include subordinated debt. ‘Hybrid 
capital’ instruments should be phased out (BCBS, 2010e, p. 2).7 Many EU regulators, in 
particular the Germans, were concerned about the ban on ‘hybrid’ capital, which would 
considerably reduce the capital base of their banks that used these and similar non-equity 
instruments in their calculation of Tier 1 capital (The Economist, 23 January 2010). By 
contrast British and American regulators were keen to exclude hybrids from the definition of 
capital (interviews, US financial regulators, Washington, 5 August 2011).  For example, a 
senior figure from the British Financial Services Authority noted that ‘…hybrid capital … 
acts like debt as far as the tax man is concerned, and … like equity as far as the depositor is 
concerned.  This hybrid capital is junior to deposits, but senior to equity’ (Huertas, 2009: 11). 
British and American regulators insisted that shareholders should take the losses for hybrids 
rather than the government having to cover it.   
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Table 1 National policy maker positions on the capital provisions of Basel III 
 United Kingdom 
(and United States) 
France Germany 
Definition of 
Capital  
Ban on hybrids for all 
tier 1. 
Tolerance on 
hybrids (esp. for 
non-core tier 1). 
Need to include hybrids 
(‘silent participations’). 
Level of Capital Higher level needed.  
Exclude double 
counting of insurance 
subsidiary capital. 
Full double 
counting of 
insurance subsidiary 
capital. 
More cautious and 
gradual rise; double 
counting of insurance 
subsidiary capital. 
Leverage ratio Inclusion. Push for 
lower ratio than 33. 
Exclusion / Or 
voluntary if 
included. 
Exclusion / Or voluntary 
if included. 
Transition 
periods 
Rapid: by 2015 at the 
latest. 
2015 / 2018 
manageable with 
qualifications intact. 
Lengthy: >decade. 
 
The total regulatory capital consists of Tier 1 Capital and Tier 2 Capital and it must be at least 
8 per cent of risk-weighted assets.8 Tier 1 must be at least 6 per cent of risk-weighted assets 
and the ‘Core Tier 1’, which comprises common equities, must be at least 4.5 per cent of risk-
weighted assets (BCBS, 2010e, p. 12). The original proposals for higher capital requirements 
were watered down in a search for a compromise between the UK, the US and Switzerland, 
keen to set higher requirements, and several continental regulators, resisting them and asking 
for longer transition periods (Financial Times, 22 October 2010). Basel III introduces a 
‘capital conservation buffer’9 of 2.5 per cent comprised of common equities, above the 
regulatory minimum. Capital distribution constraints are to be imposed on a bank when 
capital levels fall within this range (BCBS, 2010e, p. 55). On ‘Core Tier 1’, therefore, Basel 
III sets risk-weighted capital requirements of 4.5 per cent as compared to a pre-existing (Basel 
II) level of 2 per cent, plus a new buffer of 2.5 per cent, establishing a new effective floor at 7 
per cent. National countercyclical buffers, designed to take into account the macro-financial 
environment in which banks operate, are also to be introduced (BCBS, 2010e, p. 57). These 
buffer requirements, to be decided by national jurisdictions, can vary between zero and 2.5 
per cent of risk-weighted assets. Bank specific countercyclical buffers can also be imposed 
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(BCBS, 2010 e, p. 58). Capital buffers are to be phased in between 2016 and 2019. Basel III 
also envisages a capital surcharge to mitigate the risk of systemic banks, to be agreed 
subsequently.  
 
Basel III introduces a ‘leverage ratio’, which is a non-risk based ratio calibrated to act as a 
supplementary measure to the risk based capital requirements. The BCBS would test a 
minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3 per cent during the trial-run period from 1 January 2013 
to 1 January 2017 (BCBS, 2010e, p. 61). This regulatory instrument was already in use in the 
US, but its introduction into Basel III was resisted by most continental European regulators, 
who argued that the riskiness of the activities of their traditional universal banks was lower 
than that of (largely Anglo-Saxon) investment banks and that this feature would not be 
captured by a crude leverage ratio (Financial Times, 26 October 2010; interview, French 
regulator, Paris, 7 July 2011). Having failed to prevent the inclusion of the leverage ratio in 
the Basel III rules, continental regulators lobbied hard for it not to be included in the 
European Commission’s proposed legislation implementing Basel III.  
 
If one considers the evolution of the negotiations, in its draft issued in December 2009, the 
BCBS took a surprisingly hard-line approach on capital and liquidity requirements, pushing 
for a higher adequacy threshold and a restriction on hybrids, with minimum capital to be 
composed of predominantly equity capital. Given the similarity of preferences of UK and US 
regulators, their remarkable financial expertise, the large size of their financial sectors and 
their chairmanship of key working groups,10 they were able to leave a strong imprint on the 
initial Basel III draft of December 2009. However, the final December 2010 version was less 
strict:  in particular, it contained longer transition periods. This relaxation owed in part to the 
extensive lobbying from banks and bank associations but also largely to the resistance of 
continental European and Japanese regulators to some of the most draconian provisions. 
	   14	  
Indeed, at the crucial meeting of the BCBS in September 2010, three months prior to the final 
agreement, German regulators refused to endorse the document prepared by the BCBS, asking 
for and subsequently obtaining important revisions (interview, German financial industry 
representative, Frankfurt, 18 April 2012, BCBS, 2010d). 
 
The preferences of national regulators were not monolithic and different internal views tended 
to emerge once the accord had been agreed internationally and then had to be implemented 
domestically. The most notable case was in the UK where Andy Haldane, the Bank of 
England executive director for financial stability, criticized Basel III which was defended by 
then Governor Mervyn King. Haldane argued that its rules were too complex. He was a keen 
supporter of a simple leverage ratio, rather then risk-weighted assets. Deputy governor Paul 
Tucker, parting ways with both Haldane and King, refused to highlight the ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ 
problem and the need to break up big banks (The Telegraph, 27 November 2012). 
 
 
4. National financial systems and the Comparative Political Economy of Basel III in 
Europe 
 
This section engages in a Comparative Political Economy analysis of Basel III by focusing on 
three core features of national financial / banking systems in our three European countries. 
Our analysis first considers relative internationalization, identifying three kinds of ‘banking 
champions’. This is followed by an examination of the capital position of banks and their 
funding models. Our analysis then considers the relative reliance of non-financial companies 
on bank credit for their external funding needs and the bank-industry relationship. Other 
features of banking systems, such as bank funding (liabilities), are more of an issue for the 
liquidity rules in Basel III, which are not examined here 
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To summarize, each banking system reflects key features of the national Variety of 
Capitalism. The UK banking system is dominated in part by three ‘international champions’:  
highly internationalized and well-capitalized institutions with a comparatively limited 
presence – in terms of their total assets – in the domestic economy. The French banking 
system is dominated by ‘national champions’ which have an important international profile 
but retain a strong domestic presence. French banks are less well capitalized than their British 
counterparts and they rely more on domestic retail banking. The German banking system is 
both the least concentrated in Europe and the least internationalized of the three. Although 
Germany is home to two very big, highly internationalized, commercial banks – Deutsche 
Bank and Commerzbank – there are also thousands of undercapitalized public and small local 
banks which provide the bulk of funding to, and maintain close relations with, small and 
medium sized enterprises. These banks are Germany’s ‘local champions’. 
 
4.1 International, national and local champions 
The internationalization of national banking systems is measured as the percentage of 
international versus domestically held bank assets and the relative importance of domestic 
bank lending to the overall activities of banks. Domestic lending forms only a small part of 
most of these banks’ assets (Figure 1). The three largest UK-headquartered banks are major 
international players and were among the world’s ten largest banks in terms of asset size 
throughout most of the 2000s. All three held a majority of their assets internationally and a 
large majority of these international assets beyond Europe (Figure 2). During the international 
financial crisis, the British Government required two of the banks (RBS and Lloyds-HBOS) 
to accept state funding (with share purchase reaching 78 per cent for the former and 18 per 
cent for the latter) but intervention in bank management was minimal and ‘nationalization’ 
was officially presented as being limited in duration (Woll and Grossman 2013).  
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Figure 1 Loans from banks to domestic NFCs and households / Total bank assets  
(percentage) 
0"10"
20"30"
40"50"
60"70"
UK" France" Germany" German"Savings"Banks" German"Cooperatives"
2007"2009"2011"
	  
Sources: Data from Bank of England, Banque de France and Bundesbank databases, authors’ own calculations. 
 
Figure 2 Bank internationalization (per cent of total bank assets, 2007-2011 average) 
0"10"20"
30"40"50"
60"70"80"
90"
UK" UK"(3"biggest)" France" France"(3"biggest)" Germany"Germany"(excl."biggest)"
Domestic"Euro"area"assets"RoW"assets"
	  
Sources:  Bank of England, Banque de France, Bundesbank statistical databases. Registration documents for 
Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, HSBC, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole and Société Générale. Notes: The three 
largest Germany-headquartered banks (measured by assets) became two with the forced merger of Dresdner and 
Commerzbank.	  
 
Only two of the five largest French banks hold more than 25 per cent of their assets outside 
the country (Figure 2). One recent study on European banking systems categorizes three of 
the five largest French banks as ‘domestic’, one regional and one ‘semi-international’ (banks 
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with international operations reaching 25-50 per cent of total operations) (Schoenmaker and 
Peek 2014). While all five have significant assets outside the country, they rely on average 
considerably more on domestic retail banking than the largest UK-headquartered banks 
(Figure 1). The three main features of the French banking system – a combination of domestic 
focus, significant international presence and a high level of banking system concentration11 – 
owe directly to state intervention. In the 1980s and 1990s, French conservative governments 
encouraged the emergence of a limited number of large, vertically integrated banking groups 
controlled by French corporate shareholders, in a complex network of cross-shareholding with 
national firms – including insurance companies – both to improve the stability of the system 
and to foster national champions – a reflection of longstanding industrial strategy (Cohen 
1995; Hayward 1995; Schmidt 1996). Morin (2000, p. 37) has labeled this the ‘financial 
network economy’.  
 
The bancassurance model, in which insurance companies (often subsidiaries of banks) make 
use of banks to market their products, was also encouraged by state intervention through tax 
regimes (see Howarth, 2013 for further details). A range of explicit and implicit forms of 
protectionism were maintained which promoted the retail focus of some French banks. There 
is a caveat to this picture of a protectionist French banking system. Within a few years of 
privatization, the cross-shareholding networks began to unravel and foreign control of the 
largest national banks increased (Clift, 2007; Culpepper, 2005; Maclean et al., 2001). 
Although French banks dominated the domestic banking system, the actual equity ownership 
of the two large commercial banks became increasingly foreign owned in the 1990s and 
2000s. Despite the decline in cross-shareholding portfolios, important features of the 
‘financial network economy’ remained (Clift, 2012; Dudouet and Grémont, 2010), including 
shareholding pacts as between BNP Paribas and the insurance giant AXA. 
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The German banking system was among the least internationalized in Europe and, by a 
significant margin, the least concentrated.12 Only the two largest German commercial banks 
could be described as major international players. The bulk of bank assets were nationally 
held with the exception of the biggest two (Figure 2) and a small number of other commercial 
banks. The German banking system was a central pillar of the country’s Coordinated Market 
Economy (CME) by providing ‘patient capital’, either through cross-shareholding by the large 
commercial banks (which had declined significantly by the late 2000s) or ‘relational banking’ 
(Deeg, 2010; Hackethal, 2004). The German CME involved a strong reliance of non-financial 
companies on bank loans and a limited role for equity capital; a strong institutional link 
between banks and non-financial companies through formal bank representation on the board 
of large firms; and a long-term relationship of trust between the Mittelstand (SMEs) and their 
‘Hausbank’ as a lender with a special responsibility. ‘Relational banking’ thus reflected and 
reinforced the crucial position of small retail banks in the German system. The Sparkassen 
and Cooperatives were local or regionally based banks with a vested interest in the local 
economy. Regional Landesbanken (LB) provided funding through loans to Sparkassen and 
these LB were in turn backed by regional (Land) governments – officially, until the 
elimination of new government guarantees on their borrowing from July 2005, and 
unofficially since. Land governments funded the LB through ‘silent participations’ – long-
term debt. 
 
The international, national and local character of bank champions influenced the preference of 
policy makers in the three countries as to the regulatory ‘trilemma’. British regulators were 
the least pre-occupied by the economic implications of bank deleveraging and were more 
concerned as to the competitive position of their internationally-focused banks. But the 
stability of the behemoths of British banking – reflected in the size of bail-outs for two of the 
largest banks – was given priority. German regulators were most preoccupied with the 
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economic implications of deleveraging and least with the implications of Basel III for the 
stability of the national banking system and the competitive position of their locally-focused 
banks. French regulators refused to accept the relevance of ‘too-big-to-fail’ for their five large 
systemically important banks (Noyer, 2010; Financial Times, November 16, 2009): they 
deprioritized financial stability in relative terms, while highlighting competitiveness and 
deleveraging concerns. However, our characterization of bank champions in the three 
countries as international, national or local only provides a partial explanation of national 
policy makers priorities in the regulatory ‘trilemma’.  
 
4.2 Bank capital position 
The second key feature of national banking systems concerns the capital position of banks – 
principally their holding of equity and other Tier 1 capital – with a requirement to reach 6 per 
cent by 2015 and 8.5 per cent, with the capital conservation buffer by 2019. Institutions with 
higher capital ratios were in a competitively advantageous position because they were less 
likely to have to deleverage (cut their lending) or raise equity. The weak capital position of 
systemically important German banks helps to explain German regulator opposition to the 
rigid tightening of capital requirements (see Figure 3), while the biggest British banks would 
have limited difficulties to meet the Basel III standards. Clearly, early recapitalization (both 
public and private from 2007 to 2009) improved the capital position of British banks, giving 
them a massive leg-up in their ability to meet Basel III rules. For example, in its response to 
the BCBS consultation, Barclays (2010, p. 2) argued that ‘we … have pre-empted the 
anticipated change by increasing our capital ratios in 2008-9 … whilst also lowering our 
leverage and improving our liquidity positions’.  
 
With an eye to profitability and the competitive position, one senior British bank 
representative indicated that British banks would have preferred lower capital requirements, 
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but also that ‘they could live with the new levels set in Basel III’ (interview, London, 15 
March 2012). The British Bankers Association (BBA) expressed much stronger concerns in 
its documentation and official statements on Basel III. While tighter capital rules potentially 
strengthened the position of British banks in relation to undercapitalized European 
competitors, more stringent Basel guidelines, if adopted into EU legislation, could put British 
international bank champions at a competitive disadvantage in relation to non-European 
banks with headquarters in jurisdictions that either did not implement Basel III or did so only 
in part – notably the United States and China (Knight, 2010). The BBA called for a long 
transition period because of deleveraging pressures and the impact upon investor confidence 
in the event that banks retained earnings and cut dividends to share-holders to improve their 
capital position (Financial Times, 28 June 2011). British regulators thus effectively prioritized 
stability over the competition-related concerns of their biggest banks. 
 
French and German banks had pressing concerns regarding the double counting of insurance 
subsidiaries, the use of hybrid capital and the inclusion of a leverage ratio. French bank data 
suggest their strong position but the double counting of capital in the banks’ insurance 
subsidiaries – to be banned under Basel III but allowed in the EU legislation implementing 
Basel III – inflates the figures. The IMF estimates that a ban on double counting would result 
in French banks losing a total of 28.9 per cent of their Tier 1 capital, preventing several from 
meeting the 6 per cent threshold and all from meeting the 8.5 per cent threshold – with the 
capital conservation buffer – from 2019 (IMF, 2011b). A ban would hit the three large French 
commercial banks particularly hard because of bancassurance. The French Banking 
Federation considered the BCBS proposal to exclude insurance subsidiary capital from Tier 1 
capital as ‘completely unacceptable’ (Fédération Bancaire Française, 2010, p. 5). The French 
government then fought against the inclusion of the ban on double counting in EU capital 
requirements legislation. The bancassurance system predominates in certain other EU 
	   21	  
member states, including Spain and Austria. At least one British bank, the part state-owned 
Lloyds-TSB was also potentially exposed, as it is one of Britain’s largest insurance providers.  
 
Figure 3: Tier 1 capital (as a percentage of total assets) main British, German and 
French systematically important banks (non-weighted average)* 
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Sources:  EBA. Stress tests undertaken in 2010 and 2011.  Recall:  Target of 8.5% in 2015 (including capital 
conservation buffer); 11% in 2019 with discretionary buffer. *Including some hybrids (‘silent participations’ 
only) and double counting of insurance subsidiary capital. Results of the stress test based on the full static 
balance sheet assumption without any mitigating actions, mandatory restructuring or capital raisings post 31 
December 2010 (all government support measures fully paid in before 31 December 2010 are included).  UK 
banks: RBS, HSBC, HBOS (not 2010), Lloyds, Barclays. French banks: Société Générale, BNP Paribas, Crédit 
Agricole, Caisse d’Epargne (BPCE in 2010). Figures exclude Banques Populaires and Crédit Mutuel. German 
banks : Desdner (not 2010), Commerzbank, Deutsche bank. 
 
 
Banks which did not use equity to fund their activities – public sector, cooperative and mutual 
banks – faced particular difficulties meeting the new capital guidelines. These banks 
previously relied on other forms of capital to meet Basel guidelines, notably hybrids and 
specifically ‘silent participations’. The ban on hybrids would hit hardest the German banking 
system, given the heavy reliance of public and commercial banks on ‘silent participations’, 
while the large French mutuals were also exposed. Also, EU implementing legislation of the 
two previous Basel accords applied the rules to all EU-headquartered banks – not just the 
internationally active ones – on the grounds of fair competition in the EU internal market. 
Without significant dilution then, Basel III would force major changes to the German banking 
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system. It is no wonder then that the peak association representing all German banks asked for 
a grandfathering clause on Basel III capital rules of ‘at least 30 years’ (Zentraler 
Kreditausschuss, 2010, p. 3) and the German government demanded the inclusion of ‘silent 
participations’ as acceptable Tier 1 capital in the EU capital requirements legislation (see also 
Deutsche Bank, 2010). 
 
The strong opposition of French and German regulators to the use of a leverage ratio reflected 
the higher ratios of their large commercial banks (compared to the UK) and in particular the 
difficult situation facing German LB and Sparkassen and French mutual banks given the lack 
of equity capital (see Figure 4).13 Basel III was written having in mind banks funded by equity 
finance (hence the emphasis on common equities in Core Tier 1 capital), whereas the external 
funding of many EU-based banks came from other sources. Despite the significant rise in 
their leverage ratios during the two years prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis, British 
banks had been among the least leveraged in the EU, well below the Basel III recommended 
assets to equity threshold of 33 (or equity to asset ratio of 3 per cent), holding on average over 
a third more equity as a percentage of assets than German banks (ECB Statistical data 
warehouse). On first examination, the three large French commercial banks appeared to have 
a similarly low leverage ratio but the ban on double counting would weaken their position.14 
The opposition of French and German banks and their regulators to a leverage ratio, as 
opposed to a calculation of risk-weighted assets, also reflects the relative importance of trade 
financing in their overall operations. Trade financing is high in terms of overall assets but low 
in terms of risk-weighted assets. 
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Figure 4: Leverage ratio for British, German and French systemically important banks 
(non-weighted average) (assets to equity) 
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Source:  Bank balance sheets. UK banks: RBS, HSBC, HBOS (not 2010), Lloyds, Barclays. French banks: 
Société Générale, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Caisse d’Epargne (BPCE in 2010). Figures exclude Banques 
Populaires and Crédit Mutuel. German banks : Desdner (not 2010), Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank. German LB:  
HSH Nordbank, LB Berlin, LBBW, Heleba, Bayerische LB, West LB.  (LB Sachsen excluded). 
 
To conclude this section, the different capital position of banks in the three countries 
contributed to the different prioritization by national regulators of the elements of the 
regulatory trilemma. The stronger the capital position of banks, the weaker the concern with 
the impact of Basel III upon the real economy. A weaker capital position corresponded to 
greater concerns about the competitiveness of national banks and the impact of Basel III rules 
on the wider economy. In a race to the top, the new rules could provide a competitive 
advantage to British banks, which had a head-start on capital and liquidity. However, this 
should not suggest that British banks promoted more stringent guidelines:  they did not. They 
focused on their profitability and their competitive position in relation to even better 
capitalized US banks or banks in jurisdictions that were unlikely to apply Basel III in full. The 
British example demonstrates that competitiveness can be a trickier issue than much of the 
literature on ’regulatory arbitrage’ and on the dilemma between stability and competitiveness 
suggests. With regard to capital requirements, and potentially other areas of banking 
regulation, competitiveness in relation to whom becomes relevant:  Basel III promised to 
make the big British banks more competitive in relation to many EU-headquartered banks but 
also threatened their competitveness in relation to banks elsewhere. 
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4.3 Bank-industry ties 
The third key feature of national financial systems that helps to explain the prioritization of 
objectives in the regulatory ‘trilemma’ concerns bank-industry ties. In countries with less 
developed equity markets and greater reliance on bank credit, banks and more importantly 
national authorities were worried that tighter capital requirements would lead banks to reduce 
lending to industry. In most European countries there was relatively high dependence of non-
financial companies (particularly, small and medium sized enterprises) on bank finance. 
Furthermore, in a number of European countries – notably France and the Netherlands – 
where equity issuance by non-financial companies had increased significantly in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the decade prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 saw a rapid rise in 
the use of bank credit by non-financial companies (Hardie and Howarth 2013a). The long-
standing close relations between banks and industry in several continental European countries 
reinforced deleveraging concerns.  
 
In Germany, relational (hausbank) banking effectively shaped the preferences of both banks 
and regulators on capital requirements – in spite of changes in recent years (Deeg 2010). 
French non-financial companies’ reliance on equity was comparatively high, although French 
small and medium sized enterprises were more dependent upon bank credit than their British 
counterparts – which helps to explain French sensitivities (Howarth 2013). UK non-financial 
companies also came to rely much more on bank credit for their funding in the decade prior to 
the financial crisis, a development encouraged by low interest rates and the securitization of 
bank loans.  
 
Bank lending to non-financial companies in the UK dropped by twenty per cent between 2007 
and 2011 (ECB Statistical data warehouse), a refection of the massive deleveraging of British 
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banks and the collapse of securitization markets (Hardie and Maxfield 2013). By contrast, 
lending by German and French banks to non-financial companies remained relatively strong – 
down in 2009 by only 5 per cent for German banks from a 2008 peak and approximately 2 per 
cent for French banks (ECB Statistical data warehouse). Credit provision was limited 
principally by slow economic growth as opposed to the deleveraging efforts of banks. Forcing 
French and, more significantly, German banks to deleverage during a recessionary period 
could result in a credit crunch if banks reduced their lending (cut their risk-weighted assets 
denominator) instead of boosting their capital (lifting their equity numerator) which was 
likely given the difficulty of attracting capital. One IMF study from 2011 on the differential 
impact of Basel III rules on national banking systems echoes findings in a range of other 
studies: to demonstrate a particularly significant impact upon bank lending in Germany and a 
comparatively small drop in the UK, with France somewhere in between (Cosimano and 
Hakura, 2011). A BCBS study (2010c) noted differential impact but refused to be specific on 
countries. While in France, the ‘national’ champions maintained lending to the real economy 
in the years following the international financial crisis, in Germany, the comparatively stable 
levels of bank lending owed principally to the ‘local champions’ while the big internationally-
active commercial banks cut their lending considerably (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5:  Change in German Bank Lending to Domestic Non Financial Companies, 
2007-2011 (2007 = 100) 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank.  The big commercial banks include: Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, 
HypoVereinsbank (HVB) (now part of the Italian UniCredit Bank), Postbank and, prior to 2009, Dresdner Bank. 
 
To conclude this section, the systemic features of bank-industry relationships in the three 
countries contributed to the different prioritization by national regulators of the three elements 
of the regulatory trilemma. The Germans were mindful of the effects of stricter capital rules 
on economic growth given the stronger domestic bank-industry relationship. While bank-
industry ties were weaker in France, the relative importance of domestic retail activities 
(compared to international activities) of the largest French banks contributed to the 
government’s focus upon the economic implications of tighter capital requirements. For 
British regulators, the looser bank-industry relationship in the UK undermined the 
prioritization of domestic lending (Macartney 2013). Similarly, the Conservative-led 
government’s ambitious bank lending targets – enumerated in Project Merlin – were not met 
and lending by all the biggest British banks dropped in every quarter of 2011. 
 
 
	   27	  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has argued that a Comparative Political Economy analysis focused on the 
configuration of national banking and financial systems has considerable analytical leverage 
in accounting for the preferences of European regulators on Basel III, explaining the 
disagreements that emerged in Basel and ultimately the weakness of the reforms eventually 
agreed by the BCBS, despite the severity of the global financial crisis. National regulators 
faced a trilemma on financial / banking regulation, trying to achieve three different (at times 
hardly compatible) objectives. The distinctive configuration of national financial systems in 
Europe, to be precise three core features of national banking/financial systems, determined the 
ordering of national regulators’ priorities on the trilemma (see Table 2) and ultimately on 
Basel III. The different prioritization of British, French and German regulators remained 
consistent from 2009 through to the transposition of the Basel III guidelines into EU law in 
2013. 
 
Table 2 The Regulatory Trilemma: Prioritizing Stability, Competitiveness and the Real 
Economy 
 Stability  Competitiveness Real Economy 
UK 1 2 3 
France 3 2 1 
Germany 2 3 1 
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Table 3   Banking System Features and Preference on Capital Requirements 
Independent 
Variable  
Banking System 
Feature  
Objective 
prioritized / 
deprioritized 
Preference on 
Basel III capital 
requirements / 
definition 
Capital Level Higher Not the real 
economy  
Higher / Tighter 
 Lower real  economy 
concerns  
Lower / Looser 
Internationalization Higher competitiveness / 
stability (post 
crisis)  
Higher / Tighter 
 Lower real economy 
concerns 
Lower / Looser 
Non-bank source of 
NFC funding 
Higher Less concern with 
impact on real 
economy 
Higher / Tighter   
 Lower real economy 
concerns 
Lower / Looser 
 
The main findings of this research can be generalized to other cases (i.e., countries). The 
(inductive) analytical framework centred on three core features of national banking / financial 
systems can be wielded to explain the preferences of policy makers in other countries on 
Basel III and, potentially, their priorities on other areas of bank regulation (see Table 3). In 
countries, such as Germany, where strong bank-industry ties persist, policy makers will 
prioritize the economic growth leg of the trilemma, especially when banks have a weak 
capital position and thus stricter capital rules will be detrimental to lending to the real 
economy. In countries, such as the UK and the US, with weaker bank-industry ties, economic 
growth will be the less important leg in the trilemma for policy makers, especially if domestic 
banks start with a good capital position. 
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In countries, such as Germany, where the banking system is characterized by a low degree of 
internationalization and concentration, policy makers will be the least concerned about the 
competitiveness leg of the trilemma. Their local champions are unlikely to face fierce foreign 
competition domestically and national policy makers might use a range of instruments to 
make difficult foreign penetration into the domestic market. In countries, such as France, that 
have national champions that aspire to be international (or at least regional / European) 
champions, national policy makers will prioritize the competitiveness leg of the trilemma. In 
countries, such as the UK and the Netherlands, that have an internationalized and 
concentrated banking system with big international champions, policy makers will rank 
competitiveness high, but not as high as countries (notably France), where policy makers 
aspire to develop international champions. Post financial crisis, the presence of international 
banks ‘too big to fail’ but also ‘too big to be rescued’ – as in the UK, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland – encourages national policy makers to prioritize the stability leg of the trilemma, 
at least in the short to medium term. In a period of ‘quiet politics’ (Culpepper 2011), policy 
makers in countries with international champions will rank competitiveness first.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the trilemma concept has implications for future work on 
international and domestic financial regulation. It alerts scholars to the need to pay attention 
to the effects of financial regulation (especially banking regulation) upon economic growth, 
bearing in mind the configuration of national banking and, more generally, financial systems 
and their links to the real economy. The concept contributes to explaining the politics of 
international financial regulation, in particular why devising international rules is fraught with 
difficulties:  different countries have different priorities in the trilemma and face different 
trade-offs. 
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1 When the financial crisis broke out the US had not yet implemented Basel II into national 
legislation. 
2 Woll’s (2014) and Grossman and Woll’s (2013) excellent studies are focused on the leeway 
that governments had in designing bank bailouts. 
3 Throughout this article we use the term ‘regulators’. This is standard in the literature on the 
BCBS. However, it is understood that these ‘regulators’ are in fact representatives from 
supervisory bodies, many of whom have limited or no regulatory power at the national level 
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– unlike US supervisors who also possess significant autonomous regulatory powers. In the 
context of the BCBS, however, these supervisors gain decision-making power over the 
setting of the Basel guidelines. 
4 Given limited space in this article, a large number of bank association and individual bank 
positions on Basel III is presented on the Socio-Economic Review website. 
5 Given limited space in this article, a number of useful tables and figures demonstrating the 
capital position of banks in three countries and estimates on the impact of Basel III from the 
2009-2011 period are provided on the Socio-Economic Review website. 
6 We do not consider the Basel III liquidity guidelines in this paper given limited space but we 
recognise that they are an important dimension of the attempt to reinforce bank stability. 
7 Hybrids are instruments that have some features of both debt and equity. 
8 Tier 2, or supplementary capital, consists of undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, 
general provisions and subordinated term debt. 
9 This buffer is intended to promote the conservation of capital and the build-up of adequate 
buffers above the minimum that can be drawn down in periods of stress. 
10 For example, the working group on liquidity was chaired by Nigel Jenkinson of the Bank of 
England; the working group on the trading book was chaired by Alan Adkins of the British 
Financial Services Authority. 
11 In France, the five largest banks held approximately half of total bank assets (47.2 per cent 
in 2009, down from 51.9 per cent in 2005) (ECB 2010: 36). 
12 In Germany, the five largest banks held 25 per cent of total bank assets in 2009 (ECB 2010: 
36). 
13 For example, the Zentraler Kreditausschuss rejected the concept of the leverage ratio (2010, 
p. 30) and the Fédération Bancaire Française wanted to limit the use of the leverage ratio to 
Basel Pillar II (2010, p. 2). 
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14 The largest French bank, BNP Paribas, argued that the ‘leverage ratio…has proven failures 
[sic] or flawed definitions wherever it has been applied, in particular in the US. Application 
should be based at most on a pillar 2 approach’ (2010, p. 2).  
